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Subjects of Triumph and Literary History: Dido and 
Petrarch in Petrarch’s Africa and Trionfi  
 
Petrarch is much admired as the “first Renaissance 
man.” In this tenacious account, Petrarch is said to 
initiate the Renaissance with his truly historical 
consciousness, his correlative attempt to imitate 
classical style, and with his representation of the self 
as divided.
1 The fullest, most subtle and fairly recent 
example of this still vibrant tradition is Thomas 
Greene’s The Light in Troy. Here Petrarch is given pride 
of place as the first writer to express the “historical 
solitude” of a European writer who feels tragically cut 
off and isolated from the unredeemable glory of classical 
civilization, and who nevertheless attempts to diminish 
that solitude by creative imitation of classical models.
2 
The mark of truly creative, what Greene calls “heuristic 
imitation,” as distinct from a servile imitation, is the 
capacity to create a sense of historical distance. 
Petrarch’s capacity to diminish historical distance is, 
that is, measured by his capacity to create it.
3 
In this essay I examine this triumphalist account of  
Petrarch as Renaissance man, by looking to Petrarch’s own 
work of triumphs, the Trionfi. This work narrates the 
triumphs of, successively, Cupid, Chastity, Death, Fame, 
Time and Eternity. I concentrate on the first two   2 
triumphs, those of Cupid and Chastity (Triumphus 
Cupidinis and Triumphus Pudicitiae), which were most 
probably written as a pair in the first conception of the 
triumphs, and begun, most probably, in 1352, the season 
before Petrarch’s first stay in Milan, under Visconti 
patronage.
4  
My argument contributes to the revisionist critique  
of humanism recently mounted by some Early modernists and 
medievalists.
5 I argue that, in the first two triumphs, 
Petrarch does indeed shape a new sense of literary 
history and practice. So far from being a liberating 
rediscovery of classical civilisation, however, I argue 
instead that literary history is rather generated out of 
imprisonment, subjection and pain. Petrarch joins an 
elite tradition, but he can do so only by absorbing the 
painful and punishing disciplines of that imprisoned 
elite. The pain of literary history is written into the 
very form of the triumphs, whose most characteristic 
feature is the glancing literary allusion, an allusion 
most often to a moment of searing and spectacular pain. 
Literary history takes shape here as the witness to 
recurrent subjections to an imperial, triumphal power.  
In order to generate this account, Petrarch must  
first, so I argue, reshape his Ovidian inheritance. This 
redirection of Ovid is most urgently a redirection of the 
narrative of Dido, the most troubling and resurgent   3 
narrative in the triumphs of Cupid and Chastity. In 
literary history Dido’s unbearable, suicidal fate as 
Aeneas’ victim stands as the most powerful objection to 
imperial ideology. Before Petrarch can reinstate 
Virgilian epic models, he must both erase the troubling 
Dido narrative, and he must discipline Ovid. Whereas Ovid 
is the great subverter of imperial, heroic poetry, 
Petrarch seeks to close the gap between Ovidian elegy and 
Virgilian epic. Accordingly, I start with Petrarch’s 
reworkings of the Dido narrative, and move from there to 
the implications of that reworking for Petrarchan 
literary history. 
 
I 
 
Petrarch addresses, in the first instance, two  
traditions of Dido in his Trionfi: the Virgilian 
tradition and a separate, anti-Virgilian tradition.
6 The 
Virgilian tradition of Dido needs no introduction. To the 
second, anti-Virgilian tradition, Petrarch alludes twice 
in the Triumph of Chastity. The first allusion is made 
near the very beginning, as Petrarch compares himself 
with other chaste lovers: he says he sees Dido, “ch’amor 
pio del suo sposo a morte spinse, / non quel d’Enea, 
com’è ‘l publico grido” (TPud., 11-12).
7 This first 
rejection of the superficial, publicly accepted Dido is,   4 
however, insufficient. The issue clearly troubles the 
progress of the Triumphs, and Petrarch feels compelled to 
repeat and expand it soon afterwards, again making a 
point of literary history by once again dismissing common 
opinion as ignorant. Among the followers of Chastity’s 
triumphal car, he sees Dido: 
   Poi vidi, fra le donne pellegrine, 
 Quella che per lo suo diletto e fido 
Sposo, non per Enea, volse ire al fine: 
   Taccia il vulgo ignorante! Io dico Dido, 
Cui studio d’onestate a morte spinse, 
Non vano amor, com è il publico grido. 
                                  (TPud., 1.154-59) 
This anti-Virgilian tradition runs as follows: Dido lived 
more than 300 years after Aeneas. A fugitive from Tyre, 
where her husband Sichaeus had been assassinated by her 
brother Pigmaleon, she cunningly fled to the site of 
Carthage. Equally cunningly, she bought land for the 
city, which she established until, importuned by a local 
king, and by her own people who wanted her to marry, she 
committed suicide, having preferred to preserve her 
chastity.  
Petrarch passionately holds to this version,  
attested by Macrobius among others, across a variety of 
writings: in the Trionfi (as we have seen), in the Africa 
(as we shall see), and in his Epistulae Seniles.
8 There,   5 
having listed the authorities for the alternative 
version, he goes on thus: “But why I am I seeking 
authorities for something so clear? For who, except some 
of the multitude, who anywhere I ask, is so uneducated as 
not to know that the story of Dido and Aeneas is 
fictitious, and that it has gained the status of truth 
among men, eager not so much for truth as for beauty?”
9  
That Petrarch should accuse Virgil of lying poses a  
conundrum, given what has been said above about 
Petrarch’s veneration for classical literature, and his 
easily attestable reverence for Virgil in particular.
10 
The very accusation of lying in the Seniles is, for 
example, itself made in the context of a much larger, 
deeply reverential interpretation of the Virgil’s epic 
(along the standard lines of an allegorical 
Bildungsroman).
11 Petrarch introduces his discussion by 
describing the Aeneid as a “divine work,” the “very first 
and foremost” of works for those who “sip from the 
Castalian spring.”
12 Unravelling the conundrum leads us, I 
think, to one of the real motors of the Trionfi, in which 
Virgil’s text must be questioned in order that Virgilian 
ideology be preserved. Petrarch is accusing Virgil of 
lying only in order to preserve the text of the Aeneid 
for a higher truth, inaccessible to the ignorant vulgus. 
In the Seniles letter Petrarch does not explicitly answer 
the question he poses. Why, he asks, should Virgil have   6 
used so chaste a woman for a narrative in which she was 
to play to role of one “obedient to lustful love.” He 
refuses, however, to give an answer: “one can ask, but 
doubt will still remain. What I feel or think about this, 
because you will hear it from me personally, I omit here 
so as not to pile up more here.”
13 
Petrarch never says explicitly why he so favours the  
version of Dido that contradicts the version of the 
“divine” Virgil.
14 Here I suggest an answer: Petrarch 
attacks Virgil in order to save Virgil. He questions 
Virgil’s narrative, that is, at the very point at which 
it was most vulnerable to a third Dido tradition, that 
derived from of Ovid’s deeply sympathetic representation 
of Dido in Heroides 7.
15 This tradition, with a powerful 
later medieval development, is implicitly hostile to 
Aeneas and, so, to the imperial project that Aeneas 
pursues. By removing Dido from the narrative, Petrarch 
removes the most powerful stain on Aeneas’ reputation; he 
even goes so far, indeed, as to remove Aeneas from 
Carthage altogether: he cites Augustine to the effect 
that Aeneas never went to Carthage at all.
16  
This interpretation from silence might have a  
superficial plausibility, but can offer no more than 
that. What sustains it, however, are major Petrarchan 
rewritings of the Aeneas story that reinstate the Dido 
figure in a different guise. Precisely by removing Dido   7 
from the narrative of Roman/Punic relations, Petrarch 
leaves himself open to reinsert a Dido figure that 
deserves to be abandoned by a new, improved Aeneas. This 
Dido is more in keeping with the Dido regarded by some 
interpretative traditions as the personification of 
lust.
17 This reinstatement of a Dido figure is most 
obvious in the Africa, the Latin, Virgilian epic, begun 
in the late 1330s, which Petrarch continued to write 
until and beyond the putative first period of the Trionfi 
(1352), but never published. It is also true of the 
second chapter of the Triumphus Cupidinis. Both these 
rewritings, or at least recollections, of the Aeneid 
offer a reprise of Virgil’s work by laying a more recent 
amatory encounter, between Scipio’s North African general 
Massinissa and the Nubian queen Sophonisba, over the 
classical narrative.  
In the Africa this overlaying occurs in the context  
of an extended epic narrative of the Second Punic War, in 
which a new North African Dido (i.e. Sophonisba) 
threatens to impede the progress of Scipio in his 
campaign against Hannibal. Massinissa, a North African 
king co-opted to the Roman side, falls in love with the 
defeated Nubian queen Sophonisba, who betrays her husband 
Syphax in marrying Massinissa, and also persuades Syphax 
to betray the Romans. Scipio intervenes to dissuade 
Massinissa from succumbing to a vortex of sensual desire.   8 
After a violent internal struggle, torn between his 
desire for Sophonisba and his fidelity to Scipio, 
Massinissa sends poison to Sophonisba, who drinks it.
18 
Once again, this narrative is prepared for by  
carefully dismissing the Virgilian account of Dido: early 
on in the poem a minstrel praises Dido and rejects the 
account of a later poet (i.e. Virgil) who, incredibly, 
would describe her as lustful.
19 Once again, however, this 
is no dismissal of the imperial project of the Aeneid: 
very soon after that dismissal of Virgil’s Dido, Scipio’s 
general Laelius praises Aeneas as the first and founding 
Roman hero. He does so in a very brief summary of the 
Aeneid that omits any mention of Dido whatsoever (3.458-
518; 3.615-40).
20 This initial alignment with the Aeneid 
(extracting Dido yet insisting on Aeneas’ greatness) 
prepares the way for the much larger narrative palimpsest 
of the Massinissa/Sohphonisba story.  
Petrarch devotes the whole of Book 5 of the Africa  
to the Massinissa/Sophonisba episode. Having extracted 
Dido from the narrative of the Aeneid, Petrarch reinserts 
her by insistent verbal and narrative connections between 
Sophonisba and Dido: Sophonisba marries her lover in an 
illicit marriage; she betrays the memory of her first 
husband and feels guilty in nocturnal visions (Africa, 
5.257-72; cf. Virgil, Aeneid 4.457-73); her actions 
arouse the power of Rumour;
21 she threatens the Roman   9 
imperial mission; she commits suicide (Africa, 5.771-3; 
cf. Virgil, Aeneid 4.663-65); she curses the Scipio with 
the malediction of a lonely death before she dies.
22 Some 
of these narrative parallels with Virgil’s Dido are 
underscored by very explicit verbal echoes. In all this 
Scipio plays the role not so much of Aeneas, but of the 
exegete of the Aeneid, wholly untouched by erotic 
passion. Just as a long tradition of exegesis had 
interpreted Dido as the lust that youthful masculinity 
must experience and overcome,
23 so too does Scipio 
dissuade Massinissa from submission to erotic passion 
(5.386-438; 5.519-73). Or, rather than playing the 
exegete, Scipio plays the role of the mature Aeneas who 
has learned the lessons of chastity, instructing his 
alter ego Massinissa.
24 Scipio as Aeneas in this text is 
entirely sealed off from any erotic engagement 
whatsoever.  
Massinissa heeds his advice and sends to  
Sophonisba the poison with which she must kill herself. 
If Scipio and Massinissa divide the role of Aeneas, 
Sophonisba plays the role of a very fully realised Dido, 
but one much more unequivocally and maliciously 
obstructive to the Roman imperial mission, and one whose 
destruction does nothing to stain the reputation of the 
Roman imperialist. The Dido narrative has been re-
embedded in a narrative that overlays the Aeneid, but   10 
this time in such a way as wholly to justify the Roman 
response. So far from ending with any critique of the 
Aeneid or of Aeneas, the Africa ends with the imperial 
triumph of Scipio, followed by his captives. Second only 
to Scipio, at the end of the poem Massinissa, the co-
opted African who has made the right choices, is the 
biggest winner. On the way back to Rome the poet Ennius, 
who has accompanied the general Scipio, predicts Rome’s 
future greatness and predicts the laureation of the 
future Petrarch, who will sing the laureation of the 
victorious Scipio. 
What of the same narrative in the Trionfi, begun,  
perhaps, in 1352, with the Africa still unfinished and 
unpublished? The Triumphs of both Cupid and Chastity seem 
to have been written as a pair. Their most frequent 
procedure is one of allusion; thrice, however, they pause 
to develop a larger narrative. The first of these 
exceptional narratives is that of Massinissa and 
Sophonisba, whom Petrarch meets in his vision of Cupid’s 
triumph in what is very much a direct continuation of 
their story in the Africa. Just as Massinissa in the 
earlier text desires an escape from life to be joined 
with his lover, where “in darkest Hell / [as] one 
shade…Then shall we go in tears / with matching steps” 
(5.718-22), so too in the Trionfi is Petrarch drawn to 
“due che a mano a mano / passavan dolcemente lagrimando”   11 
(TPud., 2.5-6). Once again, in the prison of apparent 
subjection to Cupid, Massinissa in fact reiterates his 
real subjection neither to Sophonisba, nor to Cupid, but 
instead to Scipio, in a series of paradoxes: “Lei, ed 
ogni mio bene, ogni speranza / perder elessi, per non 
perder fede” (TPud., 2.68-9). This scene is deeply 
connected to the meeting of Dante with Paolo and 
Francesca in Inferno V, through situational resemblances 
and verbal echoes. But while Dante’s Francesca continues 
to reiterate the painful moral ambiguity through which 
she ends in Hell, Massinissa, by contrast, instead 
declares his continuing commitment to Scipio’s judgement 
that guided him on earth, as still in death. Francesca 
issues forth from “la schiera ov’ è Dido” (Inferno 5.85), 
while Massinissa insists on his triumph over the new Dido 
under direction from his general Scipio: 
    Grande giustitia agli amanti è grave offesa; 
Però di tanto amico un tal consiglio 
Fu quasi un scoglio a l’amorosa impresa.   
                                         (TPud., 2.52-4) 
Whereas Dante falls at the end of Inferno 5, overwhelmed 
both by his sympathy for Francesca and by the force of 
divine judgement, here it is instead Massinissa who 
delivers the positive verdict on his earthly rejection of 
Sophonisba. And that rejection is driven by fidelity to 
the imperial project.   12 
Once again, then, as in the Africa, Dido is  
extracted from the Aeneid only to be put right back as 
the woman whose suicide is never less than a deserved 
command from the Roman general. In order to preserve the 
Aeneas/Scipio figure from all taint of passion, the 
Aeneid requires some rearrangement. In order to save 
Virgil, Virgil must be rewritten. 
The Massinissa/Sophonisba episode (83 lines) is one  
of the few large interruptions to the habitual, allusive 
procedure of the Triumph of Cupid. The Massinissa 
episode, however, not only interrupts the narrative 
procedures of the Triumphus Cupidinis; it also disrupts 
and profoundly realigns the Ovidian premises of a 
Cupidian triumph. Petrarch’s triumph of Cupid 
unquestionably begins by evoking the opening of Ovid’s 
Amores (1.2),
25 which glories in the comic paradoxes of 
the most powerful being led in triumph as Love’s 
captives. In Petrarch’s scene, too, Caesar leads the 
first group of Cupid’s captives, a group of emperors. 
Throughout Ovid’s Amores, however, the paradox of the 
triumphal form being used to disrupt triumphal ideology 
is sustained. Petrarch, by contrast, introduces a 
powerful, anti-Ovidian pressure, by taking the 
disciplines of empire entirely seriously, and giving them 
priority above those of Cupid. Massinissa might be part 
of Cupid’s train, but his fate is determined not by   13 
obedience to Cupid so much as by his fidelity to the 
imperial ambitions of his Roman general Scipio. Petrarch, 
astonishingly, declares his own intent in the Africa as 
“utterly to destroy the cursed race of Africa” (1.74-
77),
26 in order, as Scipio’s father tells him, that the 
Carthaginians should learn again to know the “lash” of 
their mistress Rome (1.260).
27 So too in the Trionfi does 
the Ovidian Cupid learn to know the lash of imperial 
discipline. A powerful and explicitly Ovidian elegiac 
tradition is invoked only to be profoundly realigned.  
This realignment determines the pattern of battle  
and the triumphal route in the Triumph of Chastity, even 
before we witness those events.  The sequence of one 
triumphal figure following another in the Trionfi is 
ostensibly a dialectical movement: one apparently 
invincible figure is yet defeated by the next: Love by 
Chastity; Chastity by Death; Death by Fame and so on.
28 In 
fact, however, this dialectic is, in the relation of the 
first two triumphs, neutralised by the rewriting of Dido 
in the Triumph of Cupid.
29 Once Cupid is defeated from 
within his own triumph, there can be no doubt of the 
result of the encounter between Laura and Cupid in the 
following Triumphus Pudicitiae. Laura is, indeed, likened 
primarily to none other than Scipio in her moment of 
victory. Cupid falls, and 
   Non fu il cader di subito sì strano   14 
Dopo tante victorie ad Haniballe, 
Vinto a la fin dal giovene romano. 
                                  (TPud., 97-9) 
Laura’s victory does not so much as challenge as 
reiterate the central victory in the Triumph of Cupid: 
Scipio, and, by association, an imperialist ideology, 
triumph in both.
30 So too is Laura’s triumphal journey in 
the Triumphus Pudicitiae determined by fidelity to both 
Aeneas and Scipio. The struggle between Cupid and Laura 
takes place on Cupid’s island Cyprus; having won, Laura 
returns to Italy, landing first in the bay of Naples, and 
moving finally to the Capitol in Rome. En route, she 
passes two, and only two mentioned sites in sequence: the 
cave of the Cumean Sybil, whence Aeneas entered Hell, and 
the village of Scipio’s exile, Linterno. The small 
village is referred to thus: 
   In così angusta e solitaria villa 
Era il grand ‘uom che d’Affrica s’appella, 
Perché prima col ferro al vivo aprilla. 
                                    (TPud., 169-71) 
Scipio’s joining the triumph of Laura is described in a 
paradoxical formulation: born “sol per triumphi e per 
imperii,” Scipio is not displeased “’il triumpho non suo 
seguire” (TPud., 175-7). But this paradox is underwritten 
by another, much more terrible paradox embedded in the 
last line of the tercet just cited. Scipio, the champion   15 
of chastity, is described as Scipio Africanus because he 
attacked Africa first in brutally phallic manner: “perché 
prima col ferro al vivo aprilla” (TPud., 171). The deeper 
observation here is that Petrarch’s structure is not 
paradoxical at all: despite the apparent, Ovidian tension 
generated by amatory players adopting military forms of a 
triumph, the real commitment here all along is to the 
military and imperial achievement of Aeneas and Scipio, 
to opening Africa alive with the sword. Ovid’s amatory 
poetry sets the asymmetries of love and war, of Ovidian 
elegy and heroic poetry, in constant and playful tension. 
In the Trionfi, by contrast, erotic desire is 
unequivocally disciplined, however painfully, by the 
needs of imperial domination. Africa must know the “lash” 
of her imperial Roman mistress. 
 
II 
 
We began by recalling the very powerful and still  
vibrant traditions by which Petrarch is hailed as the 
first Renaissance man, by virtue particularly of his 
capacity for what Thomas Greene calls “heuristic 
imitation,” itself a code for a truly historical 
consciousness. What kind of historical consciousness is 
possible under the conditions I have just described? 
Ovidian elegy often serves as an opening of memory into   16 
spaces dominated by the apparently unassailable 
remembrance of epic: Ovid’s Dido in the Heroides, for 
example, works into the chink in Aeneas’ reputation in 
the Aeneid, and exposes a large area for 
reinterpretation. The voice of a single, suffering woman 
of labile memory pits itself, not unsuccessfully, against 
the voice of the Virgil’s divine Muses, who recount the 
apparently unassailable narrative of imperial foundation, 
often citing the gods themselves. Given Petrarch’s 
disciplining of Ovid as just described, what spaces for 
memory does that leave Petrarch as poet? Does the Trionfi 
provide evidence of a truly historical consciousness? 
Twentieth century scholarship on Petrarch offers  
many instances of denial that Petrarch has any interest 
whatsoever in politics; as a true humanist, he is solely 
concerned with moral ideals.
31 It seems to me, by 
constrast, that Petrarch places himself very squarely as 
a poet behind the imperial project of Scipio. This is 
most obviously true of the Africa, where Scipio’s father, 
in a dismissal of earthly fame, confidently predicts to 
Scipio Affricanus that a second Ennius, not inspired by 
hope of reward but only by “reverence for high-souled 
deeds,” will one day sing their glory (2.588).
32 Likewise, 
at the end of the poem, Ennius himself recounts a dream 
to the victorious Scipio of his (Ennius’) encounter with 
Homer. Together, Ennius and Homer literally foresee the   17 
young Petrarch, as prepares himself for poetic glory: 
Petrarch will “climb the Capitol,” and return thence 
“flanked by the company of Senators,” with “brow girt by 
the glorious laurel wreath” (9.323-31).
33 The intimate 
connection between state power and poetic enterprise is, 
clearly enough, expressed in the single motif of the 
triumphal laurel that crowns both imperial victor and 
poet. This future Petrarch will be the “fruit of a womb 
long barren” (9.340), a reference to Rome’s long period 
of decadence from its imperial glory that will be revived 
in memory by Petrarch. 
The Africa, then, presents a poet full square behind  
the imperial enterprise. What of the Trionfi, where there 
is, initially at any rate, a greater tension between the 
demands of empire and of love? On the face of it, the 
story is the same: even in the description of Cupid’s 
triumphal chariot, Petrarch marvels at the recuperation 
of ancient dignity, to which he is unaccustomed “per lo 
secol noioso in ch’i’ mi trovo, / vòto d’ogni valor” 
(TCup., 1.17-8). This longing for a renaissance of Roman 
state glory finds fuller expression at the end of the 
Triumph of Chastity. Here Laura imitates not only Scipio 
in deposing her trophies in a temple, but also evokes 
Petrarch’s own poetic coronation on the Capitol in 1341, 
when he, too, laid his poetic crown on the altar of the 
Basilica of St Peter.
34    18 
The perspective of the Trionfi is, however, more  
complex, and worth pausing over, the better to define the 
tortured relation between power and poetry, and the 
intensity of a historical imagination wholly subject to a 
punishing power. For in the Trionfi Petrarch is a 
prisoner to love; he does not, as he does in the Africa, 
have unimpeded access to the historical archive, with the 
long perspectives of visionary epic, in which he sees, 
and is foreseen, by his poetic and military heroes. The 
lines of sight in the Trionfi are, by contrast, 
determined rather only by the glancing, broken vision 
permissible in the slow march of triumphal captivity. 
Here, I would suggest, it is slavery that determines the 
lines of sight and the intensity of the historical 
imagination.  
Lines 85-184 of the third capitolo of the Triumphus  
Cupidinis relate the narrative of Petrarch’s own 
captivity. These very powerful lines distort the 
narrative perspective of the triumphal scene, since the 
personal memory forces its way, and expands into the 
processional description of Cupid’s passage. Petrarch 
relates in brief but poignant form the entire history of 
his love for Laura. This experience is one of 
humiliation, withdrawal and self-doubt; it is of broken 
perspectives that produce broken, torn writings (line 
117) and language that falls forever short. Above all, it   19 
recounts an intensely personal experience of subjection 
and self-division, most powerfully expressed in the set 
of anaphoric sentences beginning line 151: “Or so come da 
sé ‘l cor si disgiunge;” each of these sentences declares 
a knowledge in which knowledge is defeated: 
   So fra lunghi sospiri e brevi risa 
stato, voglia, color cangiare spesso, 
viver, stando dal cor l’alma divisa. 
    So mille volte il dì ingannar mi stesso. 
So, seguendo ‘l mio foco ovunque e’ fugge, 
arder da lunge, ed agghiacciar da presso. 
   So come Amor sovra la mente rugge. 
                                  (TCup., 3.163-69) 
This experience of the profoundly divided, not to say 
terrorised self has been taken as crucial evidence for 
Petrarch’s modernity: not only does Petrarch feel 
historically isolated in time, but he is also capable of 
inward, subjective division. I have argued elsewhere that 
this position is mistaken, since the division of self 
taken to be characteristic of modernity is in fact 
directly derivable from Ovid, and, as such, is equally 
available to a long and powerful tradition of European 
medieval lyric writing.
35  
That said, this moving passage in the Trionfi does  
signal something distinctive in Petrarch. What is new 
here is, it seems to me, the tension between this   20 
fundamentally Ovidian perspective in the context of a 
deeper commitment to the perspectives of Virgilian, 
heroic, imperialist poetry. The self is terrorised by the 
experience of its own division, but that division is not 
only, in the larger context of the Trionfi, a two-way 
cut. Petrarch’s represented self desires not only its 
self-sufficiency and integration on the one hand and, at 
the same time, its union with a relentlessly hostile, 
infinitely desirable force on the other. The division, in 
the larger context of the Trionfi, is, instead, a three-
way division, between the poles just mentioned and a 
further, even more powerful and crushing force, that of 
the need for submission to imperial duty. This triangular 
division produces a powerful new model for vernacular 
writing that was to have a very powerful response in the 
sixteenth century. It also produces a new kind of 
literary historical attention. 
This is a large claim, which might in part be tested  
by accounting for Petrarch’s immense prestige among his 
sixteenth century followers, who wrote under the regimes 
of punishing political masters; some of them also wrote 
as they were actively engaged in imperial missions.
36 The 
Petrarchan tradition in England, for example, is held 
within the contending poles of tormento and consento, to 
cite the terms of the first Pertarcan sonnet translated, 
albeit not in sonnet form, into English, by Chaucer.
37 I   21 
do not have space to pursue that claim here, but I will 
end by answering the question about Petrarch’s historical 
consciousness in the Trionfi, by particular reference to 
the formal properties of this work. Both are determined, 
I suggest, by Petrarch’s subjection to imperial demand.  
As I have said, the primary formal property of the  
Trionfi is learned allusion and/or elliptical reference. 
Each triumphal procession is peopled by figures to the 
decisive, painful, memorable moments of whose lives 
Petrarch alludes with learned, brief reference.
38 Very 
often the name is withheld, and left for the reader to 
produce. The reader is thus expected to identify the very 
first figure seen, the “garzon crudo / con arco in man e 
con saette a’fianchi” (TCup., 1.23-4), before the friend 
explicates the reference at line 75 (“Questi è colui che 
‘l mondo chiama Amore”). Sometimes the name is withheld 
altogether, leaving the reader to supply proper names 
where the text gives only pronouns or periphrases, as in 
this reference to Theseus, Ariadne and Phaedra:  
Vedi ‘l famoso, con sua tanta lode, 
Preso menar tra due sorelle morte: 
L’una da lui, ed ei de l’altra gode. 
                                 (TCup., 1.121-23) 
Or most often the name is given, but the story withheld, 
requiring the reader to supply it (e.g. TCup., 1.139-44). 
In most cases, however, whatever the precise manner of   22 
allusive, periphrastic reference, the point of the life 
recalled is a point of pain. Even where the narrative is 
withheld from a series of names, cries of pain provide 
the leitmotif for the lives withheld. Thus (the 
abandoned) Oenone and Menelaus, (the raped and murdered) 
Hermione, (the suicide) Laodamia, and (the widow) Argia 
are all very briefly named before their joint cries of 
pain are recorded: 
   Odi ‘l pianto e i sospiri, odi le strida 
De le misere accese, che li spirti 
Rendero a lui che ‘n tal modo gli guida. 
                                 (TCup., 1.145-7) 
This allusive, periphrastic listing of captive figures 
has in fact been the main source of complaint about the 
Trionfi. Critics have found the work interesting only at 
those moments where procession and allusive listing give 
way to action.
39 This complaint is superficial; it misses 
the point that brevity of allusion is the formal result 
of the narrator’s subjection. Subjection itself provokes 
the desire to know analogous stories as its consolation; 
it also determines the brevity of time permitted to know 
them. The conclusion of Cupid’s Triumph expresses both 
these points, in which Cupid’s captives find themselves, 
at the end of their procession, in a dark prison. The 
incarceration provokes the desire for impossible escape, 
a desire that is consoled only by knowing the stories of   23 
fellow sufferers. Cupid’s captives are enclosed within 
“così tenebrosa e stretta gabbia,” in which 
                       …pur sognando libertate, 
l’alma, che ‘l gran disio fea pronta e leve, 
consolai col veder le cose andate. 
                                (TCup., 4.160-62) 
Subjection provokes the desire to know literary history 
in its most intense moments, but it also determines the 
brevity of encounter. The slow pace of the procession of 
captured slaves allows the captive a glance at his 
fellows, but it also demands the slow but punishing 
onward pace that leaves the glance unsatisfied. The 
Triumph ends by making precisely this point, and so 
accounting for its own formal procedures: 
   Rimirando er’io fatto al sol di neve 
tanti spirti e sì chiari in carcer tetro, 
quasi lunga pictura in tempo breve, 
   che ‘l pie’ va inanzi, e l’occhio torna a dietro. 
                                (TCup., 4.163-66)
40 
 
The captive foot is obliged to move forwards in the 
procession of human trophies, while the eye, inspired 
precisely by its captivity, looks backwards. The 
combination of forward step and backward glance limit the 
eye’s time, and so produce allusive, literally glancing 
reference. The allusions obviously create the need for an   24 
elite readership that understands them, but the elitism 
is not what drives this particular formation of literary 
history. What drives it is the desire for freedom born of 
elite captivity, and what constrains it is lack of time. 
The experience of literary history under these conditions 
is one of exhausting fascination:  
   Stanco già di mirar, non sazio ancora, 
Or quinci, or quindi mi volgea, guardando 
Cose ch’a raccontarle è breve l’ora. 
                                     (TCup., 2.1-3) 
 
This does not seem to me to be characteristic of the 
historical consciousness so praised by critics who laud 
Petrarch’s humanism. Neither am I certain that this ideal 
of humanistic philology can ever be more than a wraith, 
an ideological measure with which to fail other forms of 
historical consciousness. But in Petrarch’s case in the 
Trionfi, at any rate, the form of historical 
consciousness is focussed on and directed by its 
attention to the pain of captives. One could argue that 
this is because Love’s law is itself a-historical and 
ineluctable, as Petrarch himself says:  
   Dura legge d’Amor! Ma benché obliqua, 
Servar convensi, però ch’ ella aggiunge 
Di cielo in terra, universale, antiqua. 
                       (TCup., 3.148-50)   25 
But, as we have seen, there is, by Petrarch’s account in 
the Trionfi at any rate, a force greater than that of 
Cupid, which is imperial raison d’etat. It too, as 
represented by Petrarch’s reconstruction of Roman forms 
in the Africa and in the Trionfi, “agguinge / di cielo in 
terra, universale, antiqua.” The reconstruction of Roman 
forms serves much less the ends of a truly historical 
consciousness than of instigating the visible sign of a 
new disciplinary force that must be served, “benché 
obliqua.” 
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I am especially grateful to Valeria Finucci for having 
organized the symposium in honor of Ron Witt at which 
this essay was originally read as a paper. I also 
aknowledge with gratitude the penetrating comments on the 
paper offered by Kevin Brownlee and Virginia Cox. 
 
1 Petrarch himself began the tradition, describing himself 
as poised between two epochs, looking forward and 
backward; he says this about himself, for example: “Ego 
itaque, cui nec dolendi ratio deest nec ingnorantiae 
solamen adest, velut in confinio duorum populorum 
constitutus ac simul ante retroque prospiciens…” Rerum 
Memorandarum Libri, ed. Giuseppe Billanovich (Florence: 
Sansoni, 1943), I.19.4, p. 19. The tradition remained 
vibrant across the twentieth century. See, for example 
(to cite only a few celebrated names), Pierre de Nolhac, 
Petrarque et l’Humanisme, revised edition, 2 vols. 
(Paris: Champion, 1965; first published 1907), Chapter 1, 
for the most triumphalist account of Petrarch as 
“l”initiateur de la Renaissance” (p. 1). Much more   27 
                                                             
measured accounts repeat the idea; see, for example 
Theodore Mommsen, “Petrarch’s Conception of the ‘Dark 
Ages’”, Speculum 17 (1942), 226-242, who decares that 
Petrarch “stands at the very fountainhead of Renaissance 
thought” (p. 242); and Nicholas Mann, Petrarch (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), who describes Petrarch as 
“the first modern man” (p. 113); and Paul Oskar 
Kristeller, “Il Petrarca nella Storia degli Studii,” in 
Petrarca e la Cultura Europea, ed. Luisa Rotondi Secchi 
Tarugi (Milan: Nuovi Orizzonti, 1997), 7-29, who 
describes Petrarch as “il profeta e precursore di molte 
correnti posteriori” and “il primo grande umanista” (p. 
7). 
2 Thomas M. Greene, The Light in Troy: Imitation and 
Discovery in Renaissance Poetry (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1982), Chapters 5 and 6 especially. See 
also p. 8: “For Petrarch…the intuition of this pathos [of 
historical solitude] was no longer redeemable; it was 
tragic. It bespoke not only the impermanence but also the 
solitude of history. This was a solitude which Petrarch 
lived out existentially, as estrangement from the 
ancients who were dearer to him…than all but a few of his 
contemporaries.” 
3   Thomas M. Greene, The Light in Troy:  “It was he 
[Petrarch] who first understood how radically classical   28 
                                                             
antiquity differed from the Christian era;…he who 
understood more clearly the philological meaning of 
anachronism” (pp. 29-30). 
4  Petrarch continued to work on and add to the Trionfi 
until the very end of his life in 1374; when he began the 
series is a matter of conjecture. The traditional dating 
is Spring 1352; see Francesco Petrarca, Trionfi, Rime 
Estravaganti, Codice degli Abbozzi, ed. Vinicio Pacca and 
Laura Paolino (Milan: Mondadori, 1996), p. 44. All 
citations are taken from this edition. For the counter 
view (that the Trionfi were begun in 1340-44, before the 
death of Laura in 1348, see, for example, Ernest Hatch 
Wilkins, Life of Petrarch (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1961), pp. 22, 31-2, 47-8. For the plausible 
theory that the first two triumphs, those of Cupid and 
Chastity, were written as a pair, see Ernest Hatch 
Wilkins, “The First Two Triumphs of Petrarch,” Italica 40 
(1963), 7-17. For Petrarch’s first stay with the Visconti 
from summer 1353, in Milan, see Wilkins, Life of 
Petrarch, pp. 129-142. 
5  See, for example, Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, 
From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the 
Liberal Arts in Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century Europe 
(London: Duckworth, 1986); Stephanie H. Jed, Chaste 
Thinking: The Rape of Lucretia and the Birth of Humanism   29 
                                                             
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1989); and 
David Wallace, Chaucerian Polity: Absolutist Lineages and 
Associational Forms in England and Italy (Stanford 
University Press, 1997), the last of which has particular 
bearing on the present argument, especially Chapter 10. 
6   For the three principal classical traditions of Dido 
(i.e. the Virgilian Dido; the “historical Dido”; and the 
Ovidian Dido) alive in the later medieval and Early 
Modern periods, see Marilyn Desmond, Reading Dido: 
Gender, Textuality and the Medieval “Aeneid”, Medieval 
Cultures 8 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1994), Chapter 1. 
7    All citations from the Tronfi are taken from 
Petrarca, Trionfi, ed. Pacca and Paolino. Further 
citations will be given parenthetically in the text by 
triumph, capitolo if relevant, and line number. 
8 For the late antique sources of the “Historical Dido,” 
see Desmond, Reading Dido, pp. 24-33 and further 
references; see also Petrarca, Trionfi, ed. Pacca and 
Paolino, pp. 228-9, who, in addition to citing the loci 
for Petrarch’s other references to the tradition of the 
“Historical Dido,” cite the relevant Latin text of the 
Epistulae Seniles 4.5 discussed below. 
9  Translation cited from Francis Petrarch, Letters of Old 
Age (Rerum senilium libri I-XVIII), 2 vols., translated   30 
                                                             
by Aldo S. Bernardo, S. Levin, and Rita A. Bernardo 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 4.5, 
pp. 139-51 (at p. 147).  
10  For Petrarch’s reverence for Virgil, see de Nolhac, 
Petrarque et l’Humanisme, Chapter 3, and W. Th. Elwert, 
“Vergil und Petrarca,” in his Europäische 
Wechselbeziehungen (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1986), 21-31 (pp. 
22-3 for Petrarch’s praise of Virgil, and pp. 26-8 for 
specific parallels between the Aeneid and Africa). 
11   For the tradition of this allegorical interpretation, 
see Christopher Baswell, Virgil in Medieval England: 
Figuring the ‘Aeneid’ from the Twelfth Century to Chaucer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Chapter 3. 
12 Petrarch, Letters of Old Age, trans. Bernardo, Levin, 
and Bernardo, 4.5, p. 140. 
13 Petrarch, Letters of Old Age, trans. Bernardo, Levin, 
and Bernardo, 4.5, p. 148. 
14   Boccaccio, who was torn between these different 
traditions, does offer an explanation of sorts(that 
Virgil, with poetic license, drew on a convenient figure 
for Aeneas’ lover, despite the historical impossibility). 
See Craig Kallendorf, “Boccaccio’s Dido and the 
Rhetorical Criticism of Virgil’s Aeneid,” Studies in 
Philology 82 (1985), 401-15 (p. 413).   31 
                                                             
15  For which see especially Desmond, Reading Dido, pp. 
33-45; and for the power of this tradition, sympathetic 
to Dido, in later medieval writing, pp. 46-55. See also 
Peter Dronke, “Dido’s Lament: From Medieval Latin Lyric 
to Chaucer,” in Kontinuität und Wandel: Lateinische 
Poesie von Naerius bis Baudelaire, ed. Ulrich Justus 
Stache, Wolfgang Maaz and Fritz Wagner (Hildesheim: 
Weimannsche, 1986), 364-90. 
16  Petrarch, Letters of Old Age, trans. Bernardo, Levin, 
and Bernardo, 4.5, p. 147. The reference is to Augustine, 
Confessions, I.13, 22. 
17  See Desmond, Reading Dido, Chapter 2, and Baswell, 
Virgil in Medieval England, p. 116. 
18   Petrarch produced three versions of this narrative, 
in the De viris illustribus, the Africa and the Trionfi. 
The sequence in the De viris, inserted into the second 
redaction (1341-43) can be found in Francesco Petrarca, 
De viris Illustribus, ed. Guido Martellotti (Florence: 
Sansoni, 1964), in “The Life of Scipio,” at pp. 227-237.  
For a descriptive account of the three versions, see Aldo 
S. Bernardo, Petrarch, Scipio and the “Africa” 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). A more 
penetrating account of the difference of emphasis in 
these three versions can be found in Johannes Bartuschat, 
“Sophonisba e Massinissa. Dal Africa e dal De viris ai   32 
                                                             
Trionfi,” in Petrarca e i suoi lettori, ed. Vittorio 
Caratozzolo and George Güntert, Memoria del Tempo 18 
(Ravenna: Longo, 2000), 109-41. 
19  All translations of the Africa are drawn from 
Petrarch’s “Africa”, translated by Thomas G. Bergin and 
Alice S. Wilson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). 
They have been checked against the Latin text, which can 
be found in Francesco Petrarca, L’Africa, ed. Nicola 
Festa, Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Francesco 
Petrarca, 1 (Florence: Sansoni, 1926). The Bergin/Wilson 
translation is in fact a very loose. I cite both the 
Festa edition and the Bergin/Wilson translation by book 
and line number; where I cite both they are in the order 
of Festa followed by Bergin/Wilson (here 3.424-7, and 
3.534-37). 
20  Aeneas is described as escaping Troy and sailing to 
Italy with reputation unstained: “…unus / Integer enavit 
sine crimine” (Africa, ed. Festa, 3.497-8). The passage 
where we would expect mention of Dido reads thus: “…et 
[Aeneas] passus terra casusque tremendos / Erroresque 
vagos et mille pericula ponti / Impiger Ausonias tandem 
tamen attigit oras” (Africa, ed. Festa, 3.505-7). 
21  Compare Petrarch, Africa, “Publica finitimas subito 
perlabitur urbes / Fama gradu” (5.273-4), with Virgil,   33 
                                                             
Aeneid, “Extemplo Libyae magnas it Fama per urbes” 
(4.173). 
22  Compare Sophonisba’s curse on Scipio: “…sint ultima 
vite / Tristia, et eximiis sua Roma ingrata tropheis / 
Exul ut a patria deserto in rure senescat / Solus” 
(Petrarch, Africa, 5.748-51), with Dido’s curse on 
Aeneas: “…nec, cum se sub leges pacis iniquiae / 
Tradiderit, regno aut optata luce fruatur, sed cadat ante 
diem mediaque inhumantus harena” (Virgil, Aeneid, 4.618-
20). 
23  See, Desmond, Reading Dido, Chapter 2; for an example 
of such a reading, see the commentary attributed to 
Bernard Sylvestris, The Commentary on the First Six Books 
of the “Aeneid” Commonly Attributed to Bernard 
Sylvestris, ed. Julian Ward Jones and Elizabeth Frances 
Jones (Lincoln, Nebr: University of Nebraska Press, 
1977). 
24   Guido Martellotti points out parallels between the 
tears of Massinissa in Book 5 of the Africa and what 
Petrarch takes to be the tears of Aeneas in Aeneid 4; see 
his essay “Lagrime di Enea,” in his Scritti Petrarchesci, 
ed. Michele Feo and Silvia Rizzo (Padua: Antenore, 1983; 
first published 1945), 44-49. 
25   For which see Guido Martellotti, “Il Triumphus 
Cupidinis in Ovidio e nel Petarca,” in his Scritti   34 
                                                             
Petrarcheschi (Padua: Antenore, 1983), 517-24; and 
Richard C. Monti, “Petrarch’s Trionfi, Ovid and Virgil,” 
in Petrarch’s “Triumphs”: Allegory and Spectacle, ed. 
Konrad Eisenbichler and Amilcare A. Iannucci, University 
of Toronto Italian Studies 4 (Ottawa: Dovehouse Editions, 
1990), 11-32. 
26  Petrarch, Africa: “Ipse ego non nostri referam modo 
temporis acta, / Marte sed Ausonio sceleratus funditus 
Afros / Eruere est animus nimiasque retundere vires” 
(1.53-55). 
27 Petrarch, Africa: “Experiere iterum et dominam per 
verbera nosces” (1.188). 
28  For the dialectical structure, see Leo Spitzer, “Zum 
Aufbau von Petrarca’s Trionfi,” in his Romanische 
Literatur-Studien, 1936-56 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1959), 
614-23 (esp. pp. 615-6). 
29  The neutralisation of the apparent dialectic between 
triumphs is, for different reasons, also noticed by 
Marguerite Waller, Petrarch’s Poetics and Literary 
History (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
1980), 114. 
30   For descriptive accounts of the relations between 
Laura and Scipio in Petrarch’s works, see Aldo S. 
Bernardo, Petrarch, Laura, and the “Triumphs” (Albany:   35 
                                                             
State University of New York Press, 1974). See also 
Petrarch, Canzoniere, no. 186. 
31 This reading of the Africa  stands opposed to the 
humanist readings that would deny its interest in 
imperial projects, and would insist instead on its 
concentration on moral virtue. Thus the two main lines of 
interpretation since the fifteenth century have been 
either that the Trionfi offer a moral allegory (the 
fifteenth-century tradition of interpretation), or that 
it is intensely focussed on passionate individual 
histories (the Romantic position). For the history of 
reception, see Bernardo, Petrarch, Laura and the 
“Triumphs” pp. 88-9. In the twentieth-century both 
traditions have continued, each repressing a politicised 
reading. De Nolhac, for example, declares that “Les 
races, les nations, le développment des empires” have 
little interest for Petrarch: “l’individu seul le 
passione.” What Petrarch seeks in classical narrative is 
“le plus puissant ressort de perfectionnement moral” (De 
Nolhac, Petararque et l’Humanisme, 2.9). Guido 
Martellotti agrees: “Ciò che per Virgilio era il compito 
fatale di fondar Roma, per Dante e il Petrarca era il 
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imperialist cause in a fascist Italy. See, for example, 
the dedication to Africa, ed. Festa: “Alla maestà 
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Iannucci, 135-46. 
39   For critical complaint about the lists, see Waller, 
Petrarch’s Poetics and Literary History, 128-9. 
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